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sisted of two major appeals:
an appeal to
metafhysics (or "quasi-metafbysics," to use
his term) and an appeal to fairness. This is
an "oversight," he says, which results in my
"ooncentrating mainly [sic] on stages (1) and
(4) (WII: p. 24). In fact, however, I omitted no stage of Wreen' s argument in my critique.
His (l)--which is really two steps
(the conceptual point and the claim that this
point supports our ability to identify with
human ~un-pers6ns)--was discussed first as an
"appeal to metafbysics." I then discussed 24 under the heading of "an appeal to fairness."
(Incidentally, (2) is already included in (3); I do not know why Wreen gave
them two numbers, given the way they are
stated. )
It is true that I spent much rrore
time on his (I) and (4); they obvious I y are
open to IIDre objection than the empirical
claims in (2-3). [4] This does not indicate
that I overlooked any part of his main argument, let alone half of it.
However, I am
happy to follow Wreen' s numbering here in
. order to avoid any further misunderstanding.

Do human non-persons have basic rights
simply because they are members of a species
characterized by personhood?
Are we justified i f we give IIDral preference to human
non-persons over non-human non-persons with
equivalent mental capacities, provided that
the latter do not belong to a species characterized by personhood?
Michael Wreen has
argued for this speciesist view in his recent, important article, "In Defense of Speciesism. "[ I]
I have very recently argued
that he fails to make a case for his view. [2]
Now Wreen has forcefully rejected my criticisms in his "My Kind of Person." [3] In the
present article, I am pleased. to contribute
another installment to the debate on speciesism.
This issue, which is central not only
to anirral rights issues but also to ethics in
general, certainly needs IIDre critical attention.
Wreen is one of the very few IbilosoIbers who has put his keen fbilosofbical
acumen to the task of defending a view taken
for granted by virtually all humans.
When
the current round of argumentative dust has
settled, however, I believe that the reader
will agree that speciesism remains unjustified.

I will argue (as I did before, but with
the benefit of Wreen' s recent responses) that
the quasi-metafhysical, conceptual claim in
(1) is not justified. Even i f (1) succeeded,
however, it-in oonjunction with the largely
correct though overstated (2-3)--provides no

Before proceeding further, I want to lay
one of Wreen' s charges against me to rest.
He thinks that I have overlooked half of his
argument.
According to his numbering, the
argument for speciesism has four stages: (I)
hllllllility and personhood are claimed to be
linked conceptually, thus providing a "solid"
basis for our ability to identify with human
non-persons in a unique way; (2 and 3) becoming and remaining a human person is subject
to the laws of nature and chance, forces over
which humans have little or no oontrol; and
(4) human non-persons should be ascribed
basic rights on the grounds of equality of
opportunity or fairness (WI: p. 52). In my
critique, I said that Wreen's argument oonBElWEEN THE
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support for speciesism without the crucial
fairness claim in (4).
I will show that
claim to be unsuccessful on two oounts.
First, let me consider ( 1 ) •
Wreen' s
argument for the claim that "the ooncepts of a human being and a person are not
related merely empirically" is his contention

main
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that it is sUPPJrted by the following "plausible" identification principle:"

of experiencing emotion, can reason and acquire understanding, can plan ahead, can act
on their plans, and can feel pleasure or
pain. " [7]
Who counts as a person in this
sense is an empirical question (assuming, as
one is amply justified in doing, that logical
behaviorism and its variants are false).
X,
let's say, has been determined to be a person.
HOI>' do we know that X is X rather than
Y?
Because X has a unique set of fOysical
characteristics. We individuate X from Y in
terms of these bodily characteristics. Likewise, after a lapse of time, we decide that
the individual we are now confronting is
probably the same X we confronted earlier
provided that this individual has the body we
previously determined to be X's.
Let's suppose that we cannot imagine circumstances in
which bodily identity would not be gocxi evidence for personal identity.
Then we could
accept (RI).
But we need not at all believe
that it is ~sarily true that "X is a live
human being" is gcxxl evidence for "X is a
human person." Whether X is a person or not
is a purely empirical matter, we can hold,
even though--~ ~ has been found to be ~
,Eerson---we may hold that the relationship
between this particular ~ and this particular
body is not purely empirical.
In short, the
follO\>'ing two questions are logically independent:
(1) "How do we determine i f X is a
person?" and (2) "How do we tell whether this
is person X and not person Y?" (RI) concerns
the second question; (IP) concerns the first.
Thus, they are also logically independent.
(RI) does not presuppose (IP).

(IP):
It's a necessary truth that
the statement "X is a live human
being" is gcxxl evidence for the
statement "X is a hUlMIl person ...
(WI: p. 50) [5]
If

(IP) is true,

then being a live human is
empiric411y-related to being a human person.
criteriologicall~--ratherthan

Why should we accept (IP)?
Because,
according to Wreen, it is a "near relative"
of another extremely plausible principle:
(RI)
[Re-identification
PrincipleJ[6]:
It is a necessary truth
that bodily identity is evidence
for personal identity. (WI: p. 50)
In my critique, I charged (a) that Wreen did
not provide a defense for (IP), since (RI) is
relevant to a very different sense of "identification," and (b) that (IP) is quite implausible in any case (p. 123).
wreen responds to (a) that the relationship between (RI) and (IP) is "obvious"--the
latter is "conceptually prior" to the former:
"For to deny (IP) while holding fast to the
re-identification principle would be like
accepting the principles of calculus while
rejecting those of basic arithmetic" (WII: p.
24). But does (RI) really presuppose (IP)?
I think not.
The bodily criterion of
personal identity concerns the question of
how we determine Whether person X is the ~
person we knew before:
is this person still
X, or is he/she another person altogether?
(RI) does not tell us how to determine whether X is still ~ person. The identification
which is genuinely conceptually prior to (RI)
is the individuation of person X fran person
Y in terms of bodily characteristics.
Such
individuation presupposes that one has already determined that X is a person. How ~
determines this is not specified.

Moreover, my original second criticism
of (IP), which I have here called criticism
(b), still stands:
since we can, with no
difficulty whatever, conceive of circumstances in which "X is a live human bei~g" would
not be gcxxl evidence for 'X is a hUlMIl person, " the claim that this evidential relationship is necessC!EY must be false (Le.,
(IP) is false).
Wreen responds by agreeing
that we can imagine the evidential relationship not to hold but denying that this shows
that (IP) is false:
All inductive principles, even the
best of them, and ~ criteriological principles, may have to give
way to particular circumstances in
the face of evidence to the contrary. (WII: p. 24, emphasis added.)

Here is how one could accept (RI) and
the bodily individuation of persons it presupposes without accepting (IP). One accepts
Feinberg's notion of "cornronsense persons" (a
notion accepted by Wreen on p. 47 of his
original article): persons in this sense are
"those beings who are conscious, have a concept and awareness of themselves, are capable

the

185

However, this won't do.
It is part of
concept of "criterion" that if x is criBmwEEN THE SPECIES

Since (4) is a normative claim, it does not
follow from the non-nonnative (1-3).
What
separate grounds are we given for believing
that "fairness" justifies the ascription of
basic rights to human non-persons but not to
non-human non-persons belonging to species
uncharacterized by personhood? These humans,
we are told, have been deprived of their
personhood by "Natural contingency" or laws
of nature beyond their oontrol.
They have
been "denied" a chance at beeaning or renaining a person by "foul fortune." Nature has
been unjust, inequitable, unfair. It is the
cause of their non-personhood.
According
these individuals basic rights is "canpensation" or "restitution" for the initial injustice. [10]
To quote frau Wreen I s defense of
(4):

teriologica.lly related to y, then there is no
evidence that we would count as showing that
x is not good evidence for y.
'!'his is what
distinguishes a criteriological claim from an
empirical one.
'Ib quote Sidney Shoemaker,
whose sense of "criterion" Wreen explicitly
adopts in his response to me (WII: p. 24).
A test of whether sanething is one
of the criteria for the truth of
joogments of a certain kind is
whether it is conceivable that we
tnight discover empirically that it
is not, or has ceased to be, evi dence in favor of the truth of such
joogments. [8]
Thus, (IP) is false.
It is at most empirically true that "X is a live hum:m being" is
good evidence for "X is a hum:m person."
Wreen has not shown that "the concepts of a
hum:m being and a person are not related
merely empirically."

What I argue, in part, is that when
nature--Iaws of nature and Natural
Contingency-denies a hum:m being
the usual qualifications for possessing basic rights, namely personhood, basic morality, perhaps
natural law, makes due restitution
for such a fundamental injustice. •
Put somewhat differenUy--ahd
certainly extravaganUy--it would
be appropriate to ask the Supreme
Court of Justice of the Cosmos for
adequate canpensation for having
been denied personhood. (WI: pp.
55-56)

If (IP) is false, it cannot provide "a
solid metafhysical basis" for the alleged
fact that we identify with human non-persons
in a way in which we cannot identify with
non-human non-persons, as Wreen claims in the
second Part of his stage ( 1 ) •
'!'his is true
regardless of how one interprets "X identifies with Y."[9]

Even if stage (1) had succeeded in its
entirety, Wreen' s argument for speciesism
would nevertheless, as I said earlier, have
failed without the final, crucial step: the
plea for fairness.
That plea, as I argued
originally, has not been shown to be conceptually ooherent in the context of Wreen's
argument.
It is also irredeemably circular.
I will now explain why Wreen's responses to
these charges leave his argument for speciesism unsalvaged.

This defense of (4) personifies nature by
implying that pure chance or natural law can
inflict injustice, deny opportunities, and
provide
"compensation" or
"restitution."
Here is another apt quote fran his defense:
Basic morality,
perhaps natural
law, ensures at least the ITUnlIClUm
of fairness here, and redresses the
moral balance, makes up for nature 's inhumanity to humanity, by
according basic rights. (WI: p. 53)

Anyone who reads Wreen's (1)-(4) can see
that (4), his oonclusion, needs explanation
and defense. Wreen, of oourse, is well aware
of this and offers us both.
According to

But only moral agents--perhaps-can inflict
injustice, provide restitution, ensure the
minimum of fairness.
The terms "Natural
Contingency, " "natural law," "the cosmos,"
and "nature" do not designate a moral agent.
So isn't Wreen' s oonceptual framework conceptually inooherent?

(4) :

Hurran non-persons, then, should be
ascribed basic rights; for although
in the primary case it is persons
who are ascribed basic
rights,
equality of opporttmity, or, better,
fairness,
requires us to
ascribe basic rights to hum':lJ1 nonpersons as well. (WI: p. 52)

Wreen replies (after rcus~ng this objection himself) that terms like '''Justice,'
'restitution,' and 'canpensation' are handy
186
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changes the circle's location.
The basic
question at issue is whether species membership can be ~ rrorally relevant characteristic.
Feinberg's version of speciesism, the
view which Feinberg rejects and which Wreen
believes that he has established by his argument, is as follows:

metaI;i1ors, just as 'accord basic rights'
is.
• • The anthropc.uorI;i1ism is not inextirpable, just convenient and vivid" (WI: p.
57) • [11 l
I replied that I would like to see
how these metaI;i1ors could be extirpated fran
the defense of (4).
He resp::mds that "the
showing in question is easy enough, though:
just read "In Defense of Speciesism" ~ the
phrases in question--or read this paper as it
stands" (WII: p. 27).

(FS) [Feinberg's version of speciesisml:
A live creature's belonging to ~ species, not necessarily our own, which is generally
characterized by personhood, is of
~ rroral weight,
and enough, in
fact, to ascribe a right to life to
that creature. (WI: p. 48)

The trouble is that eliminating these
phrases
fran "In Defense of Speciesism"
leaves Wreen with no argument. Wreen's stage
(4) --the conclusion of his argument for speciesism--itself contains these "metaphors."
This also holds for "My Kind of Person, "
which repeats the conclusion (although it
eliminates the defense for it). If "justice"
is merely a convenient metaI;i1or here, so is
"fairness." As nature, not other persons, is
clearly the culprit in (4) (see 2-3), the
objectionable personification continues.
A
genuine extirpation ~ eliminates Wreen' s
conclusion.

.,,

Wreen cannot use his principle of justice to
establish (FS).
To suppose, as Wreen does,
that the principle that "all creatures in the
relevant (person-related) class are to be
treated fairly and equally in respect to
personhood generated rights" applies to human
non-persons is to presuppose that membership
in a species characterized by personhood has
rroral weight.
Not only is the circle not
broken; it has tightened into a noose for the
argument.

If that weren't problema.tic enough, the
fatal flaw of circularity remains.
I had
argued that Wreen' s defense of speciesism is
circular as follows.
By maintaining that we
should accord basic rights to human nonpersons because they had been unfairly deprived of the personhood which is characteristic of their species, Wreen assumes that
they already have ~ basic right:
the right
to be treated justly or fairly.
(The terms
"compensation" and "restitution" make this
especially clear.) Wreen responds by distinguishing "justic~ (or fairness or equality)"
as ~ right fran "justice (or fairness or
a;rua1.ity) " as ~ principle.
The principle
grounds the right, he says.
JusticE;, ~ ~
right is not used in the argument for speciesism, Wreen tells us; justice as ~ princi~ is.
The principle of equality is applied
to human non-persons in the argument, thus
grounding their basic right to justice.
It
is not, then, presupposed that human nonpersons already have basic rights.
In this
way, Wreen argues, "the circle can be, and
is, broken" (WII: p. 27). What is the principle of "justice (or fairness or equality)"?
We are told that "all creatures in the relevant (person-related) class are to be treated
fairly and equally in respect to personhood
generated rights" (WII: p. 27).

For this reason, and many rrore, speciesism has not been justified.
If human nonpersons have basic rights-as I believe they
do-- we would do well to look beyond their
humanity for the source of these rights.
In
doing this, we will learn that non-humans-whether or not they belong to personhoodcharacterized species--have basic
rights,

too.

Notes
1. Michael Wreen, "In Defense of Speciesism," Ethics ~ Animals V (l984), pp. 4760.
Subsequent references to this article
will be indicated in the text as follows:
(WI: p. _).

2. Evelyn Pluhar, "Speciesism Not Justified," Ethics ~ Animals V (1984), pp. 12729. Subsequent references to my article will
be inserted into the text parenthetically.
3. Michael Wreen, "My Kind of Person,"
Between the Species II (1986), pp. 23-8.
Subsequent references to this article will be
indicated in the text as follows:
(WII: p.
_) • I want to thank Prof. Wreen for sending
me an advance copy of this article.

This rrove does not enable Wreen to escape the charge of circularity; instead, it
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however, I still must question his claim that
we cannot identify with non-humans. He tells
us:

4. My only objection here was that it
is often the case that hUlMl1s do have control
over circumstances which would turn them into
non-persons (P. 126) •
Wreen concedes this
(WII: p. 27). We continue to disagree about
t;p.e ethical consequences of this fact, however. See note 10 below.

All I mean is that the COlTUlOn judgment
"That could be me" holds for all hUlMl1
beings, whether persons or not, that it
doesn't for non-human non-persons. (WI:
ibid. )

5. Wreen is much less tentative about
the role of (IP ) in the conceptual stage of
his argument in his response tha.."'1 he was in
his original article.
Compare WI: pp. 49-50
with WII: pp. 24-5. See also my P. 128, n.
7.
Note, however, that (IP) implies nothing
one way or the other about the existence of
non-human species c,aracterized by personhood.
The fact of the matter is that since
"cOlTUlOnsense personhood" is not defined biologically (as Wreen himself notes on p. 47),
non-hUlMl1 persons could and - i f recent work
in ethology is correct--probably do exist
(see my p. 127). (IP) as stated is entirely
compatible with this fact.
6.

My

abbreviation, Wreen's term.

Why doesn't it hold for non-humans?
If I
"could" have been born with 47 chrOIlOsones,
why not with 46.
Why "could" I have been a
Down's child but not a chimpanzee with the
same mental capacity as a Down's child?
In
either case, I would have been enmeshed in
alternative causal series.
I find the remarks Wreen makes on the
distinction between his sense of identification and empathy baffling.
E.g., he cla~~
(WI: p. 49) that his brain-damaged Walter
Weber identifies with humans "that have no
inner life, or a radically diminished one"
(WII: ibid.).
Does Walter Weber think "it
could be me" when he contemplates another
brain-damaged human?
How so?
Another puzzle:
Wreen says that the Weber-type identification with certain humans was part of his
point in introoucing his three cases of human
non-personhood (Weber is one of those (".ases).
"I am not surePluhar quite w1derstood this,"
he remarks (WII: n. 4).
That's absolutely
true and not a bit surprising, given that
nothing of the sort was said--we were to
identify with WebeJ:--and I readily admit that
I still don't understand.
Agi3in, Wreen denies that empathy with (as opposed to identification with) the severely brain-damaged or
permanently insane is "rationally" possible,
but he says that he can empathize with birds
and antelope (WII: ibid.). But even i f these
humans were irreversibly comatose (a strange
kind of congenital retardation or permanent
insanity! ) , we can still put ourselves in
their positions.
Even i f sentience on the
part of the other individual were required
for empathy, however, this in no way shows
that we could empathize with birds but not
with, say, Alzheimer's victims.

See

WI: p. 50 and NIl: p. 24.

7. Joel Feinberg, "Abortion," in Tom
Regan, ed., Matt~s.. of Life and Death (New
York.: Random House, 1980), p. 189.
8. Sidney Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and
Self-Identity (Ithaca:
Cornell University
Press, 1962), p. 4.
9. Wreen adamantly rejects my interpretation of his "X identifies with Y." He now
says that he was not talking about "psychological identification" (of which empathy is a
form, according to all the psychologists I
have seen who write on this subject) at all
(\'lII: p. 26).
If wreen is offering a new
definition of a standard psychological term,
should he not have said so?
As it stands,
the way "X identifies with Y" is used in his
paper suggests the usual psychological interpretation. One thinks "that could have been
(or could be) me," as he repeatedly tells us.
If what he intended to refer to is not psychological identification, why use the first
person this way?
It now seems that he wants

In short,
whatever "X identified with
Y" is supposed to mean, without (IP) 's "quasi-metafX:iysical underpinning," it caTJIlot be
used to support speciesism.

to make a rnetafX:iysical point here instead: I
identify with Y i f it really could have been
me, not when I merely think "it could have
been me." (Frankly, to use the p-u-ase "identify with" instead of, say, "be identifiable
with," in making a metafX:iysical point rather
than a psychological one, seems very odd
indeed.)
Even i f this is what Wreen means,
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10. Of course, this only applies to nonpersons who have not been responsible for
their own condition through intention or
188

negligence (such as non-persons who were
Hollywood stunt people, who didn't wear their
seat-belts, or who botchErl their suicide
attempts).
This doesn't bother Wreen.
In

IF AT ALL
HUMANLY POSSIBLE

response to my having pointed out that "at
most Wreen has made a case for the ascription
of basic rights to those human non-persons
whose condition is no fault of their own" (p.
126). (The first two words are ernmasizErl
because they were inadvertently omitted from
Wreen's quotation in his response.)
Wreen
replies that it would be consistent with his
position to hold that such non-persons have
forfeited their right to life (WII: p. 26-7).
I continue to find this counter-intuitive,
but the reader must check his/her own intuitions on this point.

MICHAEL WREEN

Marquette University

lImong the many ways in which human
beings differ from animals, two are especially evident in philosomic debate.
I'm not
talking about rationality here; the rather
hard to understand objections of a few aside,
rationality is so evident as not to merit
mention.
No, I'm referring, first, to the
inability of a milosomer to entertain a
doubt that anything he/she ever wrote is or
could be wrong, and, second, his/her willingness to defend unto the death, in the form of
replies and counter-replies, every single
word he/she's ever cOllIllitted to the page.
Evelyn Pluhar and I, I am afraid, are very
much cases in point.
Here we are, going at
it again, this being the second journal and
the fifth article in the series.
Maybe, i f
we're lucky, we can sell the whole thing as a
television serial.

11. In this context, Wreen also claims
that such terms "are used metamorically by
all those who reject (88) [Singer's "speciesism"] and (FS) and, in fact, by everyone who
employs the concept of a basic right at all"
(WI: p. 57). However, (1) Why must a proponent of basic rights personify change or natural law?
Only moral agents are capable of
respecting or violating basic rights.
(2)
Rejectors of speciesism who endorse the notion of basic rights also have no need thus
to personify nature.
In reiterating his
"you, too" charge in "My Kind of Person, "
Wreen actually makes a very different charge:
he claims that anti-speciesists who accord
moral considerability to non-humans anthropomorphize these non-humans. Why? By applying
terms (moral and psychological) for which the
adult human is the m:x:l.el to those who are
non-human.
In doing this, anti-speciesists
use the terms in a "metamorical" or "derivative" sense (WII: n. 6).
In response, I
first want to point out that this would be a
very different sort of metamorizing from
that which Wreen has been chargErl with doing.
Second, to say that any application of psychological or moral terms to non-humans is
anthrofXXllOrfhism is to say that it is cognitively unjustifiErl.
But why should one accept this allegation?
Even if "Wittgenstein
has taught us" that the adult human is the
model for all psychological and moral ascriptions (I happen to be one of those fhiloso. mers who have not been "taught" this by
anybody, including Wittgenstein), it does not
follow that the application of such terms to
others is cognitively unjustified or metamorical.
8uppose that I learn the concept
of box on the basis of my exposure to cigar
boxes. Do I "cigarboximorphize" if, later in
life, I classify music boxes as boxes?
Is
this a cognitively unjustified ascription?

But let me get down to business now,
an effort to keep round five as short
possible.

in
as

The story so far has been:
I write "In
Defense of 8peciesism," [1] arguing that all
creatures belonging to a species characterized by personhood have a right to life-basically, all human beings have a right to
life~
Pluhar responds in "Speciesism Not
Justified, " [2 ] arguing that my arcJument is
defective on many counts; I reply in "My Kind
of Person, " [ 3 ] arguing that Pluhar' s criticisms won't do; Pluhar does not take this
lying down but responds yet again in· "Speciesism Revisited, "[4] defending her earlier
objections against my counter-arguments.

this

That brings us up to the present.
paper, I won't be recapitUlating

In
any
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